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CONTRACTS AND SALES
Joseph Curtis*
Legislatioll
The major legislation enacted in the 1964 regular session of the General
Assembly in the field of contracts and sales was, of course, the adoption of
the Uniform Commercial Code, to become effective January 1, 1966.1 The
Virginia version will have relatively few changes from the provisions of
the 1962 Official Text promulgated by the American Law Institute and the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. While there
may have been surprisingly few changes, for a common-law sales jurisdiction which had not adopted the Uniform Sales Act, close adherence to the
official text was of course especially important to achieve the primary
objective of national uniformity. In addition to enactment of the new uniform provisions, numerous related sections throughout the Virginia Code
were amended to subordinate them to the uniform provisions where there
might be conflict.
Noteworthy contracts and sales legislation outside of the scope of the
comprehensive Uniform Commercial Code dealt with jurisdictional matters,
licensing requirements, and false and misleading advertising.
New Code sections 8-81.1 through -81.5 2 confer personal jurisdiction over
persons and other legal or commercial entities in actions arising from their
transacting business within the state, contracting to supply services or things
in the state, breach of warranty resulting in personal injury, and other
matters with state nexus. Service of process may be made on an in-state
agent, or on the Secretary of the Commonwealth, or as otherwise provided
for by law. Additionally, the statute provides that one of the alternative
venues is the county where the plaintiff resides.
Code sections 38.1-735 through -745 now provide that any legal entity
engaged "in financing the cost of premiums for insurance on subjects of
insurance resident, located or to be performed" in Virginia is required to
be licensed in the state.3
Numerous forms of false or misleading advertising are made misdemeanors
by new Code sections 18.1-131.1 through -131.8.4
• Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. B.S., 1934, LL.B., 1937, LL.M.,
1948, New York University.
I. Va. Acts of Assembly 1964, ch. 219.
2. VA. CoDE ANN.§§ 8-81.1 through -81.5 (Supp. 1964).
3. VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 38.1-735 through -745 (Supp. 1964).
4. VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 18.1-131.1 through -131.8 (Supp. 1964). For further discussion
see Ritz, Criminal Law, 1963-1964 Annual Survey of Va. Law, 50 VA. L. REv. 1287, 1300
(1964).
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Decisions
A. Acceptance of Check Marked "Paid in Full" Does Not Always Constitute Accord and Satisfaction
Words sometimes speak louder than actions and proverbs. A check
marked "paid in full" was received for an unliquidated and disputed claim,
accompanied by a letter making it clear that defendants did not intend to
pay any more than that. Plaintiffs, however, made their position equally
dear to defendants that they were not accepting the check as full payment,
and then deposited it with a self-serving endorsement that it was accepted
only as partial payment on account. The Supreme Court of Appeals held
in Atkins v. Boatwright5 that the check was not "expressly accepted by the
creditor in satisfaction" as required to constitute accord and satisfaction
under section 11-12 of the Virginia Code.6 Thus, the payee's act of depositing a check is not necessarily acceptance of a condition stated thereon, at
least not when he makes it known to the maker that the condition will not
be observed. Perhaps the fact that the makers did not demand return of
the check when informed that it would not be treated as full payment,
mentioned but seemingly not stressed by the Court, was more decisive than
indicated.

B. And Neither, in Some Circumstances, Is Acceptance of "Final Payment"
In Day v. Abemathy,7 a road contractor was allowed to recover from the
state for materials purchased by him and unused by reason of modifications
of the road and bridge specifications subsequently made by the state engineers. Although the primary issue was the interpretation of a specific
provision of the contract relating to "eliminating items," the Court also
discussed the consequences of the contractor's acceptance of a final payment
which did not include reimbursement for the cost of the unused material.
Since there was no discussion of the contractor's claim at the time of the
final payment, and since the Highway Department was then fully aware
that the claim had been filed and that it had not been acted upon, the Court
found no waiver, accord and satisfaction, breach, or any other defense arising
out of the contractor's acceptance.

C. Unliquidated Contract Claims May Bear Interest
Section 8-22 3 of the Virginia Code provides that "in any action whether
on contract or for tort, the jury may allow interest on the sum found by
the verdict, or any part thereof, and fix the period at which the interest
5. 204 Va. 450, 132 S.E.2d 450 (1963).
6. VA. CoDE ANN.§ 11-12 (1964).
7. 204 Va. 723, 133 S.E.2d 299 (1963).
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shall commence." 8 In Beale v. King,9 an action to recover the reasonable
value of an attorney's services, the Court held this provision to be applicable
to an unliquidated as well as to a liquidated contract claim and restored the
jury's verdict allowing interest from the time at which the services had
been concluded.
Doctors and lawyers frequently work on a quantum meruit basis, and their
demands for payment are more conservative in accord with the ethics of
their professions. They are sometimes regarded as "fair game" by reluctant
debt payers, and the impetus of this decision allowing interest from the time
of conclusion of the services may make such game less fair or at least a lot
less fun. In the Beale case the services had been concluded in 1943; thus
the interest recovery would exceed the principal sum.

D. Limitations Period for Open Account
Section 8-223, discussed in the preceding section, also permits allowance
of interest in any suit in equity, or in an action or motion founded on contract, when no jury is impanelled. In Columbia .Heights Section 3, Inc. v.
Griffith-Consumers Co. 10 the Supreme Court of Appeals found no abuse of
the discretion given by the statute to the trial court in allowing interest from
the date of the last payment made on an open account.
Perhaps of greater significance was the issue of when the statute of limitations begins to run upon an open account. Is it from the date of the last
item furnished or service performed, dra\ving \vith it all of the other items,
or does a separable cause of action arise from the date of each item so that
each item is barred upon the running of its respective period? The choice
has usually depended upon whether the account was a mutual one, with
goods or services fiowing both ways, in which case the last item proved on
either side commenced the running of the period, or a single account, \vith
goods or services furnished by only one of the parties and the right to payment arising upon the billing for each transaction, albeit the unpaid balance
for prior items is carried forward. 11 However, in Columbia Heights, although a single account with bills rendered monthly was involved, it was
not shown that the parties treated the items charged as severable. Payments
had been made in round figures which bore no relation to the individual
items or the existing balance, and the Court found no intention to treat
the contract as other than entire with final payment due upon its termination. The furnishing of a thirty-nine dollar item a few days less than three
years before commencement of the action was held to draw with it, for
8. VA. ConE ANN. § 8-223 (Supp. 1964).
9. 204 Va. 443, 132 S.E.2d 476 (1963).
10. 205 Va. 43, 135 S.E.2d 116 (1964).
ll. See I AM. juR. 2d Accounts and Accounting § 15 (1962); Annot., 57 A.L.R. 201
(1928)
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measurement of the period, an unpaid balance of more than $8,400 for prior
items, the Court stressing the rule that the burden of showing that the
statutory period had expired was on the defendant.

E. Covenant Not To Sue Distinguisbed from Release
The distinction between a release and a covenant not to sue, in composition and consequences, was e:-.:plored by the Court in Lackey v. Brooks. 1 ~
A lease of vehicular equipment provided that the lessee should not be liable
for any damage to the equipment, whether or not the fault of the lessee or
its employees. The lessor was to carry insurance to protect itself against
the risks and name the lessee as coinsured so that no right of subrogation
might arise in favor of the insurer against the lessee. Damage occurred to a
leased vehicle as a result of a collision allegedly caused by the negligence
of the lessee's driver and the lessor sued the driver.
If the nonliability provision were to be construed as a release of the lessee,
the Court said that it would operate also to release the lessee's employee
on the theory that the release of one joint tort-feasor releases the others
jointly liable, and its corollary that the release of a master for the tortious
act of the servant also releases the servant. On the other hand, a covenant
not to sue one joint tort-feasor does not discharge the others; nor does a
covenant not to sue the master free his servant. The Court construed the
provision to be a covenant not to sue, as at the time of the lease there was
no claim in existence to be released, and held that the covenant was no
defense to the driver-employee.
The lower court had also construed the provision to be a covenant not
to sue, but one encompassing the lessee's employees. The Supreme Court
of Appeals could find no such intent of the parties that the covenant should
benefit the lessee's employees and accordingly reversed.

F. Absolute Promisor Not Excused by Tbird Party's Disabling Act
In Gunnell v. Nello L. Teer Co.,13 defendant had contracted to buy fill
dirt, known by the plaintiff seller as intended to be used in fulfillment of
defendant buyer's contract for state highway construction. Subsequently,
the State Highway Commission had refused to allow the soil on seller's
land to be used in construction of the highway as it failed to meet certain
content specifications. Buyer then had refused to take and pay for the fill
dirt, asserting in defense to seller's subsequent suit impossibility and mutual
mistake.
The Court found only a unilateral mistake on defendant's part in supposing
that the soil would be suitable without subjecting it to comprehensive tests,
12. 204 Va. 428, 132 S.E.2d 461 (1963).
13. 205 Va. 28, 135 S.E.2d 104 (1964).
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and ruled that no impossibility stems from the inability of an absolute
promisor to control the actions of a third party. A promise may, of course,
be conditioned upon obtaining the act or consent of a third party, but the
condition is not implied solely because the promisee knows that such act
or consent is necessary. 14 More concisely, the buyer's promise is absolute.
A failure of consideration due to frustration of purpose is sometimes
confused with, or supposedly encompassed within, a defense of impossibility. The latter envisages impossibility of the promisor's performance,
whereas the former involves the worthlessness of the consideration therefor
upon the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a circumstance beyond the control
of either party. But for either defense to prevail, it must be shown that
such circumstance formed the basis of the contract between the parties.I5
In the Gunnell case, the Court appears to have passed only upon the aspect
of impossibility and not frustration of purpose. The result should be the
same, however, so long as the Court finds, as it did in effect, that acceptance
of the dirt by the Highway Commission was not a condition of the contract
merely because the seller understood that it was buyer's intention to use the
dirt in construction of the road building project.

G. Provision Construed in Light of Contract Objectives
Under section 43-21 of the Virginia Code, deeds of trust given for construction loans prior to commencement of construction are subordinated
to mechanics' liens to the extent of the value added to the encumbered
property by the new construction.16 The priorities may, of course, be
reversed by agreement of the mechanics' lienors, and in Northern Virginia
Savings & Loan Association v. J. B. Kendall Co.p the lienholders agreed to
serve as trustees to complete and sell the unfinished houses of the financially
insecure developer and to apply the proceeds of sales first to the subsequently
incurred costs of completion and then to the "payment of construction loans
to the ... [creditors] upon the settlement of the sale of any house." Prior
to this contract the construction loan creditors had advanced substantial
sums to the developer for construction of the houses on the security of deeds
of trust, and unpaid mechanics and materialmen had filed mechanics' liens.
Induced by the contract, the construction loan creditors advanced additional
14. See Foreman v. E. Caligari & Co., 204 Va. 284, 130 S.E.2d 447 (1963), discussed
in Curtis, C01ltracts and Sales, 1962-1963 Annual Survey of Va. Law, 49 VA. L. REv.
1402, 1405-06 (1963).
15. 6 CoRBIN, CoNTRACIS §§ 1320-22 (1962).
16. VA. CoDE ANN; §43-:21 (1953); see W. T. Jones & Co. v. Foodco Realty, Inc.,
206 F. Supp. 878, 881-83 (WD. Va. 1962), aff'd, 318 F.2d 881 (4th Cir. 1963). This
section does not give similar priority to liens arising out of the "repair or improvement"
of existing buildings. VA. Coo& ANN.§ 43-21 (1953).
17. 205 Va.136, 135 S.E.2d 178 (1964).
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sums to enable completion and sale of the houses and contended that the
quoted provision gave them priority over the previously filed mechanics'
liens for the funds advanced by them prior to, as well as after, the date of
the contract. Construing the provision in the light of the whole of the
contract and its objectives, the Court of Appeals, affirming the chancellor's
decree, found no intention of the mechanics' lienors to subordinate their
prior liens to the prior deeds of trust, but only to the repayment of subsequent advances, and that the subsequent advances were made as a means
of salvaging a portion of the prior advances.

H. Creditor's Taking Absolute Title Consumes His Security Interest
A conditional vendor, or his assignee, has many alternatives for redress
upon the purchaser's default in payment. He may enforce his lien by petition to a trial judge or a bill in equity pursuant to section 55-91 of the
Virginia Code;1S he may institute an action at law for recovery of the purchase price; or he may repossess and sell the property at public auction, and
not lose his right to a deficiency judgment if he complies with the procedures
set forth in section 55-93.19 He may also take the absolute title to the property with the consent of the purchaser, but if an assignee does so without
the knowledge of the assignor-endorser of the note, the security interest
may merge into the legal title so acquired and the liability of the endorser
discharged for impairment of the security. So held the Court in ] oyner v.
Gray beal20 on finding that the assignee did not intend to preserve the lien
upon the purchaser's transfer to him of the certificate of title to an automobile.
The liability of the purchaser was not in issue since only the endorser
took action to set aside a judgment by confession obtained by the assignee
against the maker and the endorser of the note. Nothing is said in the
opinion as to transfer of possession of the automobile to the assignee as
well as the certificate of title. Is there a "repossession" discharging any
further liability of the purchaser if not followed by public sale where absolute title, but not physical possession of the property, is surrendered by the
purchaser? Or is the purchaser's voluntary execution of the certificate of
title in favor of the assignee a "new contract in writing" between them?
These are interesting questions regarding the applicability of section 55-93
which were posed by the circumstances in the case but were not in issue
before the Court.
18. VA CoDE ANN. § 55-91 (1959). This section was repealed, effective January I,
1966, by Va. Acts of Assembly 1964, ch. 219, which enacted the Uniform Commercial
Code.
19. VA. CoDE ANN. § 55-91 (Supp. 1964). This section was also repealed pursuant to
the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code. See note 18 supra.
20. 204 Va. 543, 132 S.E.2d 467 (1963).
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I. Obligations and Not Nmnes Determine Contract Parties

During the past year construction of section 8-223 of the Virginia Code,
regarding the allowance of interest on claims, occupied some of the time
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit as well as that
of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. The decisions of both courts
support the view that the section permits great latitude in the allowance or
disallowance of interest on claims, liquidated or unliquidated, in contract or
in tort, litigated with or without a jury. A jury's allowance of interest on
an unliquidated contract claim and a judge's allowance on an open account
were upheld by the Supreme Court of Appeals.21 In the Fourth Circnit
case of Newton v. American Surety Co., 22 the district court's disallowance of
interest was upheld on the ground that, although interest may be allowed
under the Virginia statute even on an unliquidated claim, the plaintiff failed
to provide clear proof of some date earlier than judgment from which it
could be computed.
The action was one against the surety for a manufacturer to recover for
the manufacturer's breach of a contract made in name between the plaintiff
construction contractor and a building supply company. Despite the manufacturer's not having been named as a party to the contract, the court found
that all of the parties understood that the goods were to be manufactured
by it in accordance with certain plans and specifications, and in fact the
purchase order was rewritten to show that it was issued to the manufacturer
when the supply company was unable to obtain bond. Recovery from the
surety was permitted for the difference between the contract price and
that paid to a third party for the materials upon the manufacturer's default.

]. Conflict of Statutes of Frauds
Under the Virginia statute of frauds, no action may be brought on an
oral contract which caunot be performed within one year. 23 The North
Carolina statute contains no such provision, and the oral employment contract in Stein v. Pulaski Furniture Corp.24 was made in that state. However,
suit for its breach was brought in a federal district court in Virginia. The
court, aclmowledging the conflict of laws rule that the validity of a contract is determined by the law of the state where made, explored the nature
of the Virginia statute to ascertain whether it was procedural, and thus
controlling in the forum state, or substantive, and thus subordinate to the
21. Beale v. King, 204 Va. 443, 132 S.E.2d 476 (1963), discussed in paragraph C;
Columbia Heights Section 3, Inc. v. Griffith-Consumers Co., 205 Va. 43, 135 S.E.2d
116 (1964), discussed in paragraph D.
22. 329 F.2d 299 (4th Cir.1964).
23. VA. Coo& ANN.§ 11-2(7) (1964).
24. 217 F. Supp. 587 (W.D. Va. 1963).
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law of North Carolina. Tracing the origin of the Virginia statute, and
considering the wording of section 11-2, "no action shall be brought," as
distinguished from the "shall be void" wording of section 11-1,2.5 Judge
Michie decided that section 11-2 was procedural or remedial and, accordingly, applied it in dismissing the action.

25.

v. . . CoDE ANN.§ 11-1

(1964).

